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The floating exchange rate system that prevails today among key international 
currencies of industrial countries brings a considerable degree of uncertainty of exchange 
rate movements.  In order to hedge the risk of unfavorable appreciation or depreciation of a 
single currency, exporters, importers and financial investors have developed a vast range of 
currency derivative instruments that allow to lock-in in advance the rates of a future currency 
conversion. These financial instruments are also used by speculators willing to arrange future 
currency selling (or buying) contracts while hoping to buy (or to sell) the currency at 
favorable anticipated exchange rates in the future, thus exposing their financial position to 
the risk of currency fluctuations.  
This paper examines the critical problems of international currency derivatives that 
have emerged in international financial markets over the past two years, emphasizing the 
departures of spot exchange rate movements from the macroeconomic fundamentals among 
the “triad” currencies: the U.S. Dollar (USD), the German Mark (DM), and the Japanese Yen 
(YE). The macroeconomic variables that theoretically play a predominant role in the 
exchange rate movements are: differences in comparable market interest rates among the 
countries (interest rate differentials), differences in the rate of growth of real GDP (income 
differentials), and differences in the rates of inflation (inflation differentials). The changeable 
sensitivity of exchange rates to these key variables is tested in this paper for the “triad” 
currencies in two periods: 1991-1993, and 1994-1995. In the latter period, some considerable 
misalignments between forward rates and changes in spot exchange rates are observed. This 
is contrary to the historical evidence of the validity of the so-called “unbiased forward rate 
hypothesis” claiming that forward rates are the best predictor of adjustments of spot rates 
(Levich, 1976). It is argued that the recently observed failure of the relationship between 
forward rates and lagged spot rates has contributed to significant losses of investors and 
speculators in international currency derivative markets.  
The examination of these relationships and the recent empirical developments provides 
useful lessons for the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe in their attempts to 
construct viable modern financial markets. This study limits the scope of recommendations 
for developing financial markets to the conditions of Poland. It assumes that currency-based 
derivative transactions may play a pivotal role in reducing systemic risk of external trade and 
financial contracts in the Polish economy presently undergoing considerable structural 
adjustments aimed at promoting export and net capital inflows. It further argues that an 
introduction of financial derivatives in Poland shall be preceded by a construction of sound 
underlying security markets. A stable currency accompanied by low inflation are necessary 
prerequisites for  a successful functioning of currency-based derivatives. 
Currency-based derivatives are complex financial instruments that are “derived” from 
the underlying currency exchange rates. They include currency forward “buying” or 
“selling” contracts, “buy” or “sell” currency futures, call and put options, currency swaps, 
and various combinations of these instruments. Their growth in the international economy L. T. Orlowski 
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has been enormous in recent years.  The total notional value of the currency-based 
derivatives in 1994 exceeded 12 trillion USD (Goldstein and Folkerts-Landau, 1994, p.10) 
up from 7.8 trillion in 1993, which itself was more than twelve times the total in 1986 
(Mussa, et.al., 1994, p. 14). One may notice that the current notional value of the currency 
derivatives in 1994 was roughly twice the size of the United States GDP.  
Despite the enormous growth of the currency-based derivatives their market was by no 
means “efficient” in 1994. Forward rates and strike prices of most currency futures and 
options contracts departed considerably from the actual changes in spot exchange rates. The 
reasons for these departures and recommendations for preventive actions are discussed in 
Section III of the paper following the brief overview of the currency-based derivative 
instruments in Section II. Section IV summarizes the examination of the currncy-based 
derivative markets by drawing concluding lessons for the construction of the efficient entry 
of the transforming economy of Poland into modern international financial markets. 
 
 
2. CURRENCY-BASED DERIVATIVES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 
As indicated above, currency based derivatives are defined as complex financial 
instruments that are “derived” from the underlying exchange rates.  As any financial 
derivative products, they can be used for risk hedging or speculation when the underlying 
security (the exchange rate) exhibits a high degree of fluctuations, thus generating a 
considerable financial risk. Therefore, the currency-based derivatives are not applicable in 
the system of fixed exchange rates. They play a significant role as hedging or speculative 
instruments under the system of floating exchange rates, especially when the currency spot 
rate demonstrates high volatility
1. 
Currency-based derivatives are used by exporters invoicing receivables in foreign 
currency, willing to protect their earnings from the foreign currency depreciation by locking 
the currency conversion rate at a high level. Their use by importers hedging foreign currency 
payables is effective when the payment currency is expected to appreciate and the importers 
would like to guarantee a lower conversion rate. Investors in foreign currency denominated 
securities would like to secure strong foreign earnings by obtaining the right to sell foreign 
currency at a high conversion rate, thus defending their revenue from the foreign currency 
depreciation. Multinational companies use currency derivatives being engaged in direct 
investment overseas. They want to guarantee the rate of purchasing foreign currency for 
various payments related to the installation of a foreign branch or subsidiary, or to a joint 
venture with a foreign partner. 
A high degree of volatility of exchange rates creates a fertile ground for foreign 
exchange speculators. Their objective is to guarantee a high selling rate of a foreign currency 
by obtaining a derivative contract while hoping to buy the currency at a low rate in the 
                                              
1 The empirical literature proves that volatility among the leading international currencies has been increasing 
since the inception of the floating exchange rate system in 1973. See Mussa, et al.,(1994, pp. 18-22) for detailed 
examination of this phenomenon. Recent Developments in International... 
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future. Alternatively, they may wish to obtain a foreign currency forward buying contract, 
expecting to sell the appreciating currency at a high future rate. In either case, they are 
exposed to the risk of currency fluctuations in the future betting on the pattern of the spot 
exchange rate adjustment consistent with their initial expectations. Speculative actions may 
have a stabilizing character on exchange rates when the observed trend of the exchange rate 
is expected to be reversed. Specifically,  when the foreign currency has been depreciating in 
domestic currency terms but it is expected to appreciate in the foreseeable future, speculators 
will aggressively buy it, thus contributing to the currency advanced appreciation. Adversely, 
when the foreign currency has been appreciating but it is expected to depreciate, speculative 
selling may speed up its depreciation or stabilize the currency rate. By contrast, foreign 
exchange speculators destabilize exchange rates when their recently observed pattern is 
expected to continue. Expecting a further depreciation of the foreign currency, they normally 
sell it, thus triggering the excessive currency depreciation (or undervaluation). They 
aggressively buy the currency which appreciation is expected to continue, contributing to a 
destabilizing currency appreciation (or overvaluation).    
To alleviate destabilizing speculative attacks on the domestic currency,  foreign 
exchange traders must see signals that the domestic currency is expected to stabilize in 
foreign currency terms. The country's monetary authority should prove anti-inflationary 
efforts and monetary tightening to reverse the trend of the domestic currency depreciation.  
Adversely, monetary easing is desirable in order to prevent an excessive appreciation of the 
domestic currency. In practice, it implies that the monetary authorities of the United States, 
Japan and the European Union ought to coordinate the directions of their monetary and fiscal 
policies in order to stabilize the “triad” currencies. Consequently, the stability of exchange 
rates between the three leading world currencies will help to accomplish a relative stability 
of many other currencies which patterns depend more or less on changes of the leading 
currencies exchange rates. However, skillful and sound monetary and fiscal policies pursued 
by smaller nations governments are essential to achieve this task. 
The most fertile ground for destabilizing speculative attacks on international currency 
derivative markets is caused by rising unbalanced inflation among the world economies. If 
domestic inflation increases unproportionally to the inflation trend among the leading 
economies, speculative selling of the domestic currency will occur, leading to the currency 
excessive undervaluation and to the net capital outflow. Consequently, currency derivative 
contracts will settle at lower strike prices and more expensive premiums. Similar effects 
occur when the national inflation is “stalled” at a high level, showing symptoms of high 
inflation inertia in the form of high wage demands and strong parallel price hikes by 
domestic producers and trading companies. In essence, lowering inflation and reducing 
speculative selling of domestic currency are necessary conditions for the introduction of 
viable derivative contracts for domestic currency in foreign currency terms. 
The most commonly used instrument among the currency derivatives are currency 
forward contracts. These are large notional value selling or buying contracts obtained by 
exporters, importers, investors and speculators from banks with denomination normally 
exceeding 2 million USD. The contracts guarantee the future conversion rate between two 
currencies and can be obtained for any customized amount and any date in the future. They 
normally do not require a security deposit since their purchasers are mostly large business 
firms and investment institutions, although the banks may require compensating deposit L. T. Orlowski 
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balances or lines of credit. Their transaction costs are set by spread between bank's buy and 
sell prices.   
Exporters invoicing receivables in foreign currency are the most frequent users of these 
contracts. They are willing to protect themselves from the currency depreciation by locking-
in the future currency conversion rate at a high level. A similar foreign currency forward 
selling contract is obtained by investors in foreign currency denominated bonds (or other 
securities) who want to take advantage of higher foreign that domestic interest rates on 
government or corporate bonds and the foreign currency forward premium. They hedge 
against the foreign currency depreciation below the forward selling rate which would ruin 
their return from foreign financial investment. Investment in foreign securities induced by 
higher foreign interest rates and accompanied by the forward selling of the foreign currency 
income is called a covered interest arbitrage. It is feasible when the return on foreign 
investment shown by the right-hand side of the equation (1) is greater than the return on 
domestic investment (the left-hand side of the equation). 
 
                                 Ki Ki F
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where K is the amount of capital invested, i is the domestic interest rate, i* is the 
foreign interest rate, F is the forward rate and S is the spot value of the domestic currency in 
foreign currency terms. 
 
The forward selling contract is also used by speculators expecting a strong depreciation 
of the foreign currency. For instance, speculators may want to obtain the forward selling 
contract of DM at 1.39 DM per USD, hoping that the USD may depreciate well below this 
level, say, to 1.35 DM per USD, thus generating a profit of DM 0.04 on each  USD invested. 
The forward currency buying contract is widely used by importers invoicing payables 
in foreign currency, willing to protect themselves from the excessive appreciation of the 
foreign currency when it would become too costly to satisfy the foreign currency payments.  
International investors allocating their capital in domestic currency and willing to show 
profits in foreign currency (for instance, in order to pay lower foreign taxes) also hedge 
against an excessive foreign currency appreciation using the forward currency buying 
contracts. The speculative use of these contracts makes sense when the foreign currency is 
expected to strongly appreciate. Speculators will exercise the buying contract hoping to sell 
the foreign currency at a higher spot rate in the future. For example, speculators may wish to 
obtain the USD forward buying contract at 1.39 DM per USD expecting the USD to 
appreciate above it and to sell it at 1.42, thus generating a profit (before transaction costs) of 
DM 0.03 on each USD in transaction. 
Forward contracts are the most commonly used currency-based derivative instrument in 
international financial markets. Their conversion rates are set by banks to their clients on the 
basis of simple formulas related to nominal interest rate differentials (differences between 
domestic and foreign market interest rates on comparable fixed income securities). For 
instance, if U.S. three-month Treasury bills are rising in nominal terms above the German 
three-month government bills, the USD will be set at a forward premium equal to the change 
in the nominal interest rate differential.  Recent Developments in International... 
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A simple method of determining the forward rate based on the nominal interest rate 










                                                       (2), 
where n is the number of days in the forward contract. 
 
For instance, a bank offering a three-months forward contract in DM per USD would 
like to set the forward rate when the German nominal interest rate is 5.5 percent and the U.S. 
rate is 6 percent (annualized) on comparable three month T-bills, and the current DM per 
USD spot rate is 1.4. It may solve the problem by substituting these values to the equation 
(2): 











Solving the equation for F gives the value of the three months forward rate in DM per 
USD equal to 1.40175, which implies that the USD is at 0.005 (or 0.5 percent) annualized 
three month forward premium in DM terms (the right-hand side of the equation), equal to the 
annualized interest rate differential (the left-hand side of the equation). 
The empirical literature (Levich, 1985; Tucker, Madura, Chiang, 1991, pp. 259-261) 
presents a strong evidence supporting the claim that forward rates are the best forecast of 
spot rate adjustments due to speculative actions taking advantage of the exchange rate 
arbitrage (buying currencies at the currently available lower rates on international financial 
markets and immediate selling at higher available rates)
2. The phenomenon of forward rates 
serving as a good predictor of future spot rates is called an unbiased forward hypothesis. 
The forward rate levels which serve as a basis for market-based exchange rate forecasting 
have been assessed as a more accurate forecasting instrument that complex econometric 
models developing regression functions of exchange rates, or technical forecasting methods 
involving use of historical exchange rate data to predict future values
3. The principle behind 
spot rates following closely the pattern set by forward rates is related to the market clearing 
mechanism of speculative actions.  For instance, when the three months forward rate shows a 
premium for DM in USD terms, speculators will take advantage of arbitraging opportunities 
by arranging forward selling contracts of DM while buying DM spot as long as spot rates are 
below the three months forward rate pattern. By generating a stronger demand for DM in the 
spot market, they will lift the spot rate to the forward level. Adversely, if the DM is at a 
forward discount, speculators will arrange forward buying contracts hoping to sell DM at a 
higher spot rate. The action will be feasible as long as the spot rate is above the forward 
pattern. By selling the DM spot, they will adjust the exchange rate downward to the forward 
trend. 
                                              
2 A contrary opinion stating a weak relationship between forward rates and future adjustments of spot rates is 
expressed, among others, by Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Fama (1984) and Tucker, Madura and Chiang (1991, p. 263) 
3 For a comprehensive examination of technical, fundamental and market-based forecasting see, for instance, 
Madura (1995, pp. 239-257) L. T. Orlowski 
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The belief in a strong association between forward rates and anticipated adjustments of 
spot rates has been well established in international financial markets and confirmed by their 
practice until 1993 (Madura, 1995, pp. 249-252). Because of the perceived strong 
relationship between the forward trend and the actual changes in spot rates, strike prices of 
currency futures and options have been also very closely related to the forward rate trend, 
and ultimately, they have been strongly tied to nominal interest rates differentials.  
Currency futures are financial contracts specifying a standardized volume of currency 
that is to be exchanged at a specified settlement date. The rate of the future currency 
conversion (the strike price) is locked in upon the contract origination, although the 
premiums (prices paid for the contract) vary all the time. Currency futures have fixed 
denominations and fixed settlement dates upon which they can be exercised.  The largest 
market for currency futures is the International Money Market - a branch of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange. Blocks of currency units per contract traded on this market include: 
100,000 Canadian and Australian Dollars, 125,000 DM and Swiss Francs, 62,500 British 
Pounds (BP), and 12,500 YE. Standard delivery dates are limited to third Wednesdays of 
March, June, September and December of each year. There is a security deposit requirement 
for these contracts. They are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission of 
the U.S. Government, in contrast to forward contracts which are self-regulating. Although 
they are traded on the centralized exchanged floor in Chicago, the access to this marketplace 
is available through world-wide communication. The currency futures selling or buying 
contracts are obtained by exporters, importers, banks and international investors, and also by 
qualified public speculators. Their strike prices different from spot rates attract speculative 
transactions in a similar way to the differences between forward rates and spot rates.   
Speculators may generate substantial gains as long as the futures strike price differs from the 
spot rate and no gains are feasible when both rates are roughly equal. Currency futures 
contracts must be exercised on the settlement date. Because of the high degree of 
inflexibility - fixed settlement dates, fixed amounts in one block, the obligation of delivery - 
they are becoming less popular then currency options. 
Currency options are contracts that guarantee the right to buy foreign currency (a call 
option) or the right to sell foreign currency (a put option) on a specified date in the future 
and at a strike price fixed by the contract. They do not have to be exercised if spot exchange 
rates are more favorable to their holders. For instance, an international exporter invoicing 
receivables in DM may want the DM put option at a strike price of 0.70 USD per DM and 
the premium of 2 cents per each DM to expire if the spot rate of the DM rises to 0.73 USD or 
above. The Philadelphia Exchange is the major international market of both call and put 
options on international currencies, although currency options contracts are available in 
Amsterdam, Montreal, Chicago CME, Chicago Board Options Exchange, New York 
Mercantile Exchange and other markets as well. The blocks of currency call and put options 
available in Philadelphia are half of those of the Chicago futures (62,500 DM and SF, 50,000 
CanD and AusD, 6,250,000 YE, 31,250 BP). Options on the French Franc (250,000 in a 
single bloc) and on the European Currency Units (ECUs) (62,500) are also available. These 
contracts have monthly settlement dates. 
Currency call options are used mostly by importers invoicing payables in international 
currencies, investors in domestic securities (say, USD)  who want to exercise gains in foreign 
currencies,  speculators anticipating a sharp appreciation of the foreign currency above the 
level of the call's strike price plus premium. Perhaps the most desirable use of these contracts Recent Developments in International... 
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is by multinational companies engaged in foreign direct investment projects which still may 
not go through, or companies exploring possibilities of such projects through market 
research and feasibility studies in foreign countries. They need to hedge certain “sunk” costs 
in foreign currencies, that is, costs that must be incurred regardless whether the project will 
or will not materialize. 
Currency put options are used by exporters invoicing receivables in foreign currencies, 
investors in foreign currency - denominated securities, and speculators anticipating a strong 
foreign currency depreciation so that they are able to purchase the currency at a weak 
anticipated spot rate in the future reselling it by exercising the put option contract with a 
higher strike price. 
There are two types of currency options that depend on settlement time conditions. The 
“American-style” currency options can be exercised at any time before or on the expiration 
date.  The “European-style” options can be exercised only on the expiration date. The 
“American-style” options offer the holder more flexibility since they can be sold to a third 
party or exercised prior to the expiration date if the direction of spot exchange rate does not 
favor waiting for the options maturity date. 
The level of premiums on currency options depends generally on three factors. The 
most influential among them is the difference between the strike price and the current spot 
exchange rate.  In the case of call options, the higher the strike price is in relation to the 
current spot rate, the lower the option premium will be. This is because the speculative 
demand for the least expensive call options is normally the strongest. They are the most 
beneficial and valuable for the speculators, therefore, their premiums will be the highest.  
Adversely,  for currency put options higher premiums are set for options with higher strike 
prices in relation to the current spot rate. Again, put options with higher strike prices are 
more beneficial to speculators willing to sell the foreign currency at the highest conversion 
rate. Consequently, they have normally higher strike prices. These relations are illustrated by 
Table 1, where premiums for the BP calls in USD terms decline with higher strike prices and 
premiums on puts rise as the strike price increases. The second factor affecting option 
premiums is the length of time until the expiration date. Options, both calls and puts, for a 
longer time duration are associated with a higher degree of uncertainty of the spot exchange 
rate forecast, thus their premiums will be higher. Table 1 shows that August 1995 options 
premiums for the BP are more expensive than July 1995 options. The third influential factor 
affecting options premiums is the degree of currency volatility. Premiums on both call and 
put options are higher for more volatile currencies, since the risk of departures of spot rates 
from the options strike prices is higher in their case. 
Table 1. British Pound options in US Dollars on June 7, 1995 in Philadelphia 
Exchange (premiums in cents per BP; BP 31,250 in a single option). 
Strike Price  Call   Options  Put   Options 
  July ‘95  August'95  July ‘95  August'95 
1.575 1.83  3.26  0.42  2.03 
1.600 0.55  2.09  1.57  3.23 
1.625 0.07  1.22  3.54  4.83 
Source:  Financial Times. L. T. Orlowski 
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Currency options provide to their holders a very high degree of flexibility of 
applications. They can be obtained at different levels of strike prices, considerably departing 
in many instances from the current spot rate. If the adjustments of spot rates assume 
unfavorable directions to investors and speculators, they may always consider reselling these 
instruments to a third party even before the expiration date. Because of the variety of strike 
prices and a the wide extent of duration ranging from one month to two years or recently 
even more, investors may apply in their financial schemes various combinations of currency 
options instruments creating more complex, sophisticated currency-based derivative 
securities. The scope of this paper does not allow for a more detailed coverage of complex 
derivatives, although some of their basic types are worthwhile to signalize in order to grasp 
the coverage of recent developments in these markets presented in the next section
4. 
The simplest among option-based currency derivatives is a straddle which is a 
combination of a call and a put option with the same strike price and the same expiration 
date. It normally has two different premiums. It is particularly beneficial when the 
underlying currency has a high degree of volatility. Holders of a straddle benefit when the 
spot rate departs considerably from the strike price by a higher margin than the combined 
premium on a call and a put option. Depending upon the direction of this departure, investors 
may decide to exercise one of them and forego the other paying both premiums. 
The combination of a call option and a put option on the same currency with the same 
expiration date but at different strike prices is called a strangle. In this case the investor 
expects the spot rate to fall within the margin between the call and the put strike price in 
order to benefit from exercising both the low-value call and the high-value put. The profit is 
equal to the difference between them minus the premiums on both options. 
The forecasted pattern of adjustments of spot rates decides whether the investor prefers 
to apply a bull spread or a bear spread. The bull spread is a combination of currency 
options with different maturity dates designed to profit when the spot value of the underlying 
currency is expected to rise, for instance, a combination of a short call (in one month) and a 
long call (in several months) option. The bear spread is applied when the underlying 
currency is expected to depreciate and it will normally involve short and long put options in 
order to lock in currency selling rates within the next few months. Such an option is highly 
desirable to hedge a continuous revenue stream in a currency expected to considerably 
depreciate. Similar directions of expected changes in spot rates decide about the choice 
between a strip and a strap. A strip is the combination of a long position in one call and two 
put options with the same strike price and expiration dates, designed to benefit the investors 
betting on the currency depreciation in the future. A long position in one put and two call 
options with the same strike price and expiration date is called a strap, aimed at benefiting 
the investors when the underlying currency is expected to considerable appreciate. 
When the direction of changes in the spot rate is highly uncertain, importers invoicing 
their payment in a foreign currency ought to consider applying a butterfly spread with 
calls. This instrument involves three calls with the same expiration date on a given currency 
at three different strike prices. Correspondingly, exporters and investors in foreign currency-
denominated securities may consider a butterfly spread with puts, again, when the 
                                              
4 A highly recommended examination of complex derivative securities can be found in Hull (1993, pp. 415-432) 
and in Kolb (1994, pp. 387-640). Recent Developments in International... 
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expected direction of the spot rate is highly uncertain. They may obtain a combination of 
three puts with the same expiration date but at three different strike prices. Since these 
instruments involve a larger number of options at different strike prices their combined 
premium is normally very high, they are certainly very expensive to their holders. 
The listed above instruments are only the very basic combinations of currency options 
used predominantly for hedging purposes. From the standpoint of this analysis it shall be 
emphasized that designing all of these financial instruments very much depends on the 
direction of the spot exchange rate forecast. The viability of these derivatives exists only if 
they are centered around the actual future pattern of the exchange rate. They completely fail 
if the actual adjustment of the spot rate departs considerably from the forecasted level.   
Although these options do not have to exercised and they may be resold to other investors, 
their premiums to be paid are normally very high and may be a source of considerable losses.  
Therefore, it is essential to correctly predict future changes in spot rates to benefit from these 
derivative instruments.   
As discussed before, the available forward rates have been perceived as the 
empirically-proven best indicator of future changes in spot rates. Consequently, they have 
served as a basis for forecasting spot exchange rates by “derivative product engineers” at 
financial institutions. Until the early 1990s, the spot rates among the leading international 
currencies did follow forward rates, which, as indicated above, were closely related to 
nominal interest rate differentials. This situation contributed to a relative success of more 
complex currency-based derivatives. However, recent departures of spot rates from the 
forward trend and from the macroeconomic fundamentals, especially from interest rate 
differentials, tell a different story. 
 
 
III.  RECENT  DEVELOPMENTS IN DERIVATIVES OF THE ”TRIAD” 
CURRENCIES 
 
There has been a number of failures of investments in currency-based derivatives 
reported since mid-1993. Several leading international investment banks reported heavy 
losses from investments in derivative securities. American investment institutions such as 
Merril Lynch or Bankers Trust reported losses from currency-based derivatives in 1994.  
Barrings of London lost close to USD 1 billion on wrong betting on Tokyo market futures as 
a result of a tremendous risk exposure created by the bank's trader Nicholas Leeson 
investment schemes. One of the leading international investors Mr. George Soros and his 
investment fund who were once able to benefit USD 2 billion from correct speculation on the 
BP depreciation on the day of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism crash on September 
19, 1992,  reported a heavy loss of USD 600 million from wrong betting on the Japanese 
Yen alleged depreciation against the USD in February 1994. Many other financial 
institutions also admitted losses in these markets. 
Perhaps the most useful lessons for the discussion on the scope of international 
regulation of derivative markets can be learned from the cases the Chilean copper mining 
company Codelco, and the German mining and metals conglomerate Metallgesellschaft AG L. T. Orlowski 
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(Goldstein and Folkerts-Landau, 1994, p. 11). Codelco reported a loss of USD 207 million in 
January 1994 from trading in copper futures. The head futures trader of the company 
apparently entered incorrectly some of the futures transactions in the computer system 
generating an original loss of USD 30 million and he did not inform his supervisors about his 
error. Later, he attempted to regain the loss by speculating on the futures markets.  But with 
the declining copper prices this speculation multiplied the original loss.  In the beginning of 
1994, Metallgesellschaft had to admit its financial fiasco. The company sold long-term 
contracts to customers to provide petroleum products at fixed prices with an option to 
terminate the contract by the customers at the cost equal to half of the realized profit at any 
time, if the spot price of petroleum was above the forward price.To cover this risk exposure, 
the company hedged its position in long-term futures contracts. The scheme was beneficial 
to the company as long as the market was in the so called “backwardation” position related 
to the advantage of spot prices over the forward prices. In the “contago” position, when spot 
prices were lower than the forward price, the contract was disadvantageous. This position 
prevailed in international futures markets contributing to a loss of DM 1.9 billion reported in 
January 1994. The company traded 55,000 of these contracts in the New York Mercantile 
Exchange (Nymex) and since the amount was twice larger that the allowed limit, Nymex 
requested a margin call that could only be covered through the rescue package of DM 1.5 
billion from Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank. 
These failures have contributed to an extensive discussion among the U.S. lawmakers 
and governments other countries on the methods and the scope of possible regulation of 
international derivative markets. However, their deliberations have produced almost no 
concrete results. It is impossible to introduce an extensive regulatory framework for these 
markets. They are too complex and too global to be restrained by a single government 
regulation. For instance, hedging or speculation on Philadelphia currency options and their 
complex combinations can always circumvent possible domestic restrictions on currency-
based derivatives outside the U.S. American investors may also go to international derivative 
markets in response to possible regulatory efforts in the U.S. There  is a high degree of 
liquidity of international capital which can always bypass attempts of regulation escaping to 
financial centers where restrictions on capital flows do not exist. 
Nevertheless, some general rules for companies engaged in derivative instruments shall 
be applied as a lesson from the Codelco, Metallgesellschaft, Barrings and other companies 
mistakes. Among them are full disclosure rules to the management or, perhaps even to 
shareholders of firms on the mechanism and the degree of risk of transactions involving 
derivative securities. Most of the international banks have already such rules in place but 
they do not always follow them, especially in the cases when very complex currency-based 
derivative instruments are applied by portfolio managers and they are not fully understood 
by senior executives. It seems that an extensive training of executives in modern financial 
products conducted by qualified professional companies and consultants and cosponsored by 
government regulatory agencies shall be also recommended.  Most of the leading financial 
companies in the U.S. have established “product engineering” divisions aimed at introducing 
complex derivative schemes to which they hire mathematicians and physicists with doctoral 
degree, but with a limited economic training. Another desirable regulatory effort is the 
introduction of high margin requirements for investors in derivative securities so that 
smaller, more risky players-speculators are discouraged from these markets. Recent Developments in International... 
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If the regulation of these markets is to be successful it must be coordinated 
internationally by most qualified agencies, preferably by the Bank for International 
Settlements of Basel, Switzerland. The BIS has already accomplished solid steps toward 
partial regulation of international capital through the 1988 Capital Adequacy Directives 
(CAD) modified and extended in April 1993 by the BIS Committee on Banking Supervision 
introduction of a new set of capital requirements for banks. Corresponding measures have 
been also endorsed by the European Union Capital Adequacy Directives in March 1993 
which modified the Solvency Ratio and Own Funds Directives of 1989. In brief, these 
measures include: 
•  the rules for capital requirements for market risk 
•  measurement of interest risk 
•  recognition of netting schemes 
•  separation of bank's loan and trading books 
•  the isolation of market risk from specific risk (which includes credit risk, settlement 
risk, liquidity risk, and the risk of adverse movements of underlying securities) 
•  rules of conversion of fixed-income securities into more liquid debt-related securities. 
 
These efforts will never compensate for the factors that are essential for the stability of 
international derivative securities. Perhaps the most critical among them is international 
coordination of monetary policies leading to a relative stability of floating exchange rates.  
Such coordination is essential since “dreams” of returning to the global fixed exchange rate 
system are simply unrealistic. Foreign exchange reserves of central banks reaching up to 
USD 120 billion for Japan and Taiwan are a tiny fraction of daily capital turnovers of 
approximately USD 600 billion in international financial markets. There is no reserve money 
to support such a system especially under the present conditions of growing trade and fiscal 
imbalances among the leading economies. Stable market-determined exchange rates will 
undeniably reduce the ground for destabilizing speculation and lower the risk of currency 
fluctuations. This, in turn, will reduce the cost of complex currency derivatives. For instance, 
butterfly spreads with call or put options will no longer be feasible if the spot exchange rate 
is expected to fluctuate within a narrower range. Instead, simple straight and less costly call 
or put options will be preferred. 
The reality of foreign exchange markets in recent two years has not shown an improved 
stability of exchange rates between the leading international currencies. Consequently, there 
has been a growing difficulty to correctly forecast changes in spot rates and to set strike 
prices of most currency-based derivatives. As a result, significant errors and losses in 
investing in international derivatives have emerged. At least three general factors that 
contributed to these losses deserve a closer examination. They include: 
•  departures of spot exchange rate from the macroeconomic fundamentals 
•  a growing instability of spot exchange rates 
•  departures of spot rates from the forward level that historically serves as a best-fit 
forecast for spot rates adjustments 
 L. T. Orlowski 
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To illustrate the relationship between spot exchange rate fluctuations and changes in 
the macroeconomic fundamentals, a multivariate regression function of spot rates, as a 
dependent variable and income (GDP) differentials, interest rate differentials, and inflation 
differentials can be applied. The function which serves as a basis for technical or 
econometric forecasting of current exchange rates can be written: 
 
                      S ab y y ci i d p p =+ − + − + − (* ) ( * ) (* )                                       (3) 
 
where S is the spot exchange rate expressed in a foreign currency value of a unit of 
domestic currency, y is the rate of growth of domestic GDP, y* is the rate of growth of 
foreign GDP, i is the domestic market interest rate, i* is the foreign market interest rate, p is 
the domestic rate of inflation and p* is the rate of inflation overseas. 
All of the variables are coincident in time t and no lagged adjustments are incorporated 
in this simple function.  Parameters a, b, c and d are regression-fitted coefficients. 
 
Since the purpose of this analysis is to examine the most recent relationships between 
spot rate and macroeconomic fundamentals, the empirical testing of this function has been 
conducted in two series of weekly observations. The first sample of observations covers the 
two-year period between November 15, 1991 and February 15, 1993 and the second sample 
investigates the most recent period between March 2, 1994 and July 18, 1995. The 
examination is restricted to the “triad currencies” (USD, DM, YE) in relation to the GDP 
differentials between the United States, as a “domestic” variable and, separately, Germany's 
and Japan's GDP growth rates as “foreign” variables. The same countries differentials are 
applied to short-term (three month government securities) interest rates, and inflation rates.  
Spot exchange rates and interest rates are monitored on the end-of-week basis, and GDP 
growth rates and CPI inflation rates are carried over respective weeks based on the most 
recently reported national statistics. 
The results of these tests are presented in Table 2. The empirical testing is based on two 
general modifications of formula (3). The investigated function is a log-lin relationship, 
which has been proven by the empirical literature to have a higher deterministic value 
(Hakkio, 1986; Frankel, 1989; Marrinan, 1989). This form also holds better in test applied 
for the purpose of this analysis yielding higher R-squared and F-statistics. The applied 
function has been also modified in all cases by the first-order autoregressive correction 
AR(+1) aimed at neutralizing the substantial positive autocorrelation of unadjusted functions 
reflected by their Durbin-Watson (DW) d-statistics ranging between  0.31 (for the DM per 
USD test in the early series) and 0.43 (for the YE per USD series in the early test). The 
modified function that served as a basis for empirical testing which results are shown in 
Table 2 is represented ny the euqation (4): 
 
        Ln ( *) ( *) ( *) S ab yy c ii d p p eAR( 1) =+ − + − + − + +                           (4), 
where LnS is the natural logarithm of spot rates in DM per USD and, separately, in YE 
per USD terms. Recent Developments in International... 
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Based on the theory of determination of exchange rates, coefficient b ought to assume a 
negative sign if one believes in the adjustments between international demand in commodity 
markets and spot exchange rates. Namely, if the U.S. economy grows at a faster rate than the 
Japanese (or the German) economy, the American demand for foreign goods increases and 
the spot value of the USD in YE terms (or in DM terms) falls. The stronger U.S. demand for 
foreign goods results in the stronger U.S. demand for foreign currencies which are expected 
to appreciate, thus the USD ought to depreciate. Adjustments in capital markets have an 
adverse effect. If the U.S. GDP is expected to grow faster than the foreign GDP, the 
international demand for U.S. securities should rise, thus contributing to the USD 
appreciation. Therefore, b would assume a positive sign. Coefficient c is always expected to 
have a positive sign, since rising U.S. nominal interest rates above the corresponding foreign 
rates generate higher interest yields on USD-denominated fixed-income securities and result 
in a stronger foreign demand for these securities and for the USD. Consequently, the USD 
will appreciate, showing a direct relationship between the interest rate differential and the 
spot exchange rate. Coefficient d is expected to be negative reflecting an inverse relationship 
between the inflation differential and the spot exchange rate. Specifically, if the U.S. 
inflation grows faster than overseas, the USD is expected always to depreciate.  
The empirical results presented in Table 2 show very low values of statistical 
significance (low t-statistics) of sensitivity coefficients b, c and d. Only in the first series of 
observations, the DM per USD exchange rate shows statistically significant sensitivity of 
spot rates to interest rate and inflation rates differentials between the U.S. and Germany. The 
second DM per USD regression does not comply with this degree of significance. For the 
YE per USD exchange rate both series have extremely low significance of b, c and d 
coefficients proving a weak adherence of spot exchange rates to these key macroeconomic 
variables.   The highest statistical significance is assigned to coefficient e and to the 
autoregressive correction AR(+1) reflecting a very strong role played by expectations of 
future spot rate movements in the determination of current exchange rates. The departure of 
the DM per USD rate from interest rate differentials and inflation differentials proves that in 
the recent period spot exchange rates have exhibited a  weaker sensitivity of spot rates to 
macroeconomic relationships than before.  
It is worthy to explain the reversal of the sign of the c coefficient between both periods.  
The coefficient is positive in the first period both for the DM per USD and the YE per USD 
regressions, being consistent with theoretical assumption of the determinants of exchange 
rates.  But in the second period it assumes negative values.  It is not surprising. In 1994 and 
in the first quarter of 1995 the U.S. Federal Reserve applied seven rounds of monetary policy 
tightening while the USD actually experienced a sharp depreciation. Consequently, U.S. 
three months T-Bill rates gradually increased to the peak level of 6.3 percent in the 
beginning of January 1995, being only slightly adjusted downward by mid-July of 1995 to 
5.7 percent, while comparable German rates gradually fell from the peak level at the 
beginning of the series in March 1994  of 5.8 percent to the lowest level of 4.3 percent at the 
end of the series. Japan's rates, operating at very low nominal levels due to some deflationary 
pressures, peaked at 2.35 in mid-January 1995, falling to a mere 0.82 in mid-July. 
Correspondingly, the USD gradually fell in DM terms from 1.73 in the beginning of the 
series to 1.38 in the beginning of July 1995, and in YE terms it fell from 105 in March 1994 
to 84.2 in the beginning of July 1995. The sign reversal of c and the subsequent departure of 
spot exchange rates from the nominal interest parity condition is an unprecedented L. T. Orlowski 
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phenomenon. It strongly distorted the relationship between forward and spot rates since 
forward rates, always strongly tied to nominal interest rate differentials, showed a much 
stronger USD than spot rates. 
 
Table 2:   Regression Estimates of the Log-Lin Functions of DM per USD and YE per USD 
Exchange Rates and Income, Interest Rate, and Inflation Differentials. (End-or-Week Data) 
 
Coefficients     Nov 15, 1991 - Feb15, 1993 Series     March 2, 1994 - July 18, 1995 Series 















































2  0.92 0.85  0.92  0.94 
F-stat.  156.92 74.56  121.05  164.18 
DW- stat.  1.64 1.97  2.06  1.51 
Note: 
1 t-statistics in parentheses 
Source: Author's own estimation. 
 
Another intriguing finding is the difference in the sign of the coefficient d between the 
DM per USD and the YE per USD series. The coefficient of sensitivity of spot rates to the 
inflation differential for DM per USD series is negative, thus consistent with theoretical 
assumptions. However, the coefficient has a positive value for the YE per USD series. This 
development is complex to explain and an answer to this puzzle would require additional 
investigations. However, throughout the 1990s the USD was continuously depreciating in 
YE terms while at the same time the U.S. inflation was declining by a stronger margin than 
the Japanese inflation. This stems from the fact that inflation in Japan already operates at a 
very low or negative level, while the U.S. inflation had a higher starting point with the 
beginning of the current economic recovery. 
The reversal of the sign of the coefficient b in the second series of observations for the 
YE per USD rate deserves a further explanation. For the remaining series b is positive 
indicating that the U.S. GDP outperforming the growth of German and Japanese economies 
contributed to the USD appreciation. This relationship is usually transmitted via adjustments 
in capital markets, since the faster U.S. economic growth contributes to a stronger 
international demand for U.S. securities and, consequently, for the USD. The negative sign Recent Developments in International... 
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of the coefficient b for the YE per USD in the second series implies that the growing U.S. 
income created a strong U.S. demand for Japanese goods and for the YE. The sustained deep 
U.S. trade deficit with japan confirms this relationship.  Therefore, it may be argued that the 
recent changes in the YE per USD rate have been very sensitive to the inability of the U.S. to 
improve its trade imbalance with Japan and despite the positive income differential for the 
U.S., it is the Japanese currency which has actually appreciated. 
In summary, spot exchange rates between the “triad” currencies are recently showing a 
relatively weak sensitivity to income, interest rate and inflation differentials
5. They are, 
therefore, increasingly related to determinants of exchange rates that are not incorporated in 
the basic model prescribed by formula (4). One may speculate that the relative weakness of 
the USD has been recently tied to a low confidence of international investors and currency 
traders in the U.S. ability to control its fiscal and trade imbalances. Among them, the 
persistent deep U.S. trade deficit with Japan is particularly relevant for the determination of 
the YE per USD exchange rate. It contributes to a significant undervaluation of the U.S. 
currency (Krugman, 1992, chapters 1 and 2). 
The second general factor that contributed to failures in currency-based derivatives is 
the growing degree of instability of exchange rates between the leading international 
currencies. As argued before, larger fluctuations of exchange rates contribute to higher 
premiums paid for currency futures and options making them more expensive for investors 
and speculators. The empirical literature on the subject of stability of floating exchange rates 
generally proves a growing degree of volatility and misalignments of spot rates between key 
currencies as the system of floating rates progresses (Mussa, et.al., 1994, pp. 18 - 24). To 
some extent, the development of currency-based derivatives has cushioned the growing 
volatility of spot exchange rates by providing a vehicle for hedging the increasing risk of 
currency fluctuations. But the augmented volatility also means that costs of hedging with 
derivatives are higher due to more expensive premiums. Mussa (et.al., 1994) provide a 
convincing evidence that since the inception of the floating exchange rate system in 1973 
fluctuations of exchange rates among the ”triad” currencies have gradually become larger 
and less predictable.This finding can be enforced by the examination of recent developments 
in spot exchange rates between these currencies. In both series of weekly observations that 
served as a basis for the tests presented in Table 2, the growing volatility of spot exchange 
rates can also be detected. In the first series of observations covering the period between 
November 15, 1991 and February 15, 1993,  the coefficient of variation (the ratio of standard 
deviation to the mean value) of the DM per USD spot rate was 4.0 percent (0.04). For the YE 
per USD spot rate the coefficient of variation was only 2.8 percent. The coefficient rose 
sharply for both currencies in the second series of weekly observations covering the period 
March 2, 1994 - July 18, 1995, reaching 6.9 percent for the DM per USD and 7.9 percent for 
the YE per USD exchange rates. In essence, spot exchange rates between the “triad” 
currencies are not only departing from the macroeconomic fundamentals but they are also 
experiencing a growing degree of volatility and unpredictability. Under such conditions, the 
risk of failures in investing in currency-based derivatives becomes more apparent. 
The third factor contributing to jitters in currency-based derivative markets are 
misalignments between forward rates and future changes in spot exchange rates in the recent 
                                              
5 An interesting alternative analysis of recent departures of exchange rates from macroeconomic fundamentals is 
presented by Clark (1994) L. T. Orlowski 
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period of time. As discussed above, the unbiased forward rate hypothesis requires that the 
spot rate ought to follow the trend set forth by the forward rate level
6. But the empirical 
evidence in 1994 and 1995 does not support this rule. For instance, the one-year forward rate 
available on July 1, 1994 showed a mere 0.52 percent USD discount in DM terms and a 3.27 
USD discount in YE terms. In fact, the DM per USD spot rate fell from 1.583  on July 1, 
1994 to 1.390 on July 1, 1995, which indicates a 12.2 percent depreciation of the U.S. 
currency. At the same time, the YE per USD spot rate fell from 98.68 to 84.22 showing a 
14.7 percent depreciation of the USD. In both cases the USD scored much lower than the 
forward rate would imply. The weaker USD spot rate on July 1, 1995 than the one-year 
forward rate available on July 1, 1994 reflects negative savings from hedging DM 
receivables in USD terms (expressed as a difference between the lagged spot rate and the 
forward rate). If the exporters and investors in DM securities did not hedge with the forward 
DM selling contract they would generate higher USD returns by converting the DM at a 
lower spot rate. The same rule applies to receivables from exports or investments 
denominated in YE. Correspondingly, speculators betting on the USD appreciation above the 
forward level obtained DM or YE forward buying contracts (or buy futures and call options) 
to be exercised on July 1, 1995. Their forecast of spot rates stemming from perceived 
adjustments in monetary policies would be consistent with theoretical principles of exchange 
rate determination since the Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy more than 
Bundesbank or the Bank of Japan. To those who assumed such investment position the steep 
depreciation of the USD in both DM and YE terms turned out to be a disaster. 
The sharp depreciation of the USD below the forward rate level was beneficial to 
importers of goods invoicing payables in DM or in YE, or to investors in USD securities 
exercising benefits in foreign currencies if they hedged with the forward DM and YE buying 
contracts with the USD stronger than in the spot market. Exercising forward contracts, DM 
and YE buy futures and call options cost them less USD for each unit of DM or YE than the 
purchase of these two currencies in the July 1, 1995 spot market. On the contrary, if 
importers invoiced their payables in USD hedging with the USD forward buying contract 
was less beneficial. One may presume that this position was widespread among international 
importers since most of the international trade transactions are still paid in USD and 
unhedged transactions are rather rare. 
In summary, departures of exchange rates from macroeconomic fundamentals, growing 
volatility of key exchange rates and misalignment between forward rates and the spot 
adjustments have generated a higher degree of risk in international financial markets. They 
also have contributed to a failure of exchange rate forecasts which in turn generated a higher 
degree of uncertainty of investing in currency-based derivatives. All of the currency-based 
derivatives are designed on the basis of forecasted underlying spot exchange rates.   
Specifically, if the USD is expected to appreciate in terms of other leading international 
currencies, forward buying contracts, buy futures, USD call options or any combinations of 
options with calls prevailing shall be applied by international investors. Their application 
may turn out to be catastrophic if the USD actually depreciates. 
 
                                              
6 Refer particurarly to Fama (1984) for a dissident voice expressing doubts about the evdence supporting the 
unbiased forward rate hypothesis. Recent Developments in International... 
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IV.  CONDITIONS FOR INVOLVEMENT OF POLISH  FIRMS IN 
CURRENCY-BASED DERIVATIVE MARKETS 
 
An effective currency risk management shall be a part of financial strategies in 
transforming economies of Central and Eastern Europe. The examined increasing volatility 
of exchange rates among the world's leading currencies, growing inaccuracy of exchange 
rate forecasts and misalignments between forward rates and actual changes in spot rates 
contribute to an accelerating degree of currency risk in international trade and financial 
transactions. On the one side, an exposure to the currency risk can be harmful for expanding 
trade transactions, international financial investing and foreign direct investment projects 
which are critical for constructing a modern open economic systems. But on the other side, 
developing hedging mechanisms of currency risk may promote international exchange of 
goods and capital, as well as enhance gains from trade, and international financial and 
foreign direct investment. A greater involvement of Poland and other former centrally-
planned economies in international currency-based derivative markets allows to establish an 
effective mechanism of currency risk hedging. 
For the purpose of an effective entry of the Polish Zloty (ZL) into forward contracts 
with other currencies Poland needs to establish a relative stability of underlying spot 
exchange rates. This stability does not mean an application of a currency peg at the present 
stage of the economic transformation. Rather, somewhat more flexible formulas of the 
exchange rate ought to be favored so that the country's monetary policy is not fully based on 
the exchange rate target. The stage of transformation which requires active structural 
adjustments induced by the realignment of relative prices ought to be accompanied by the 
exchange rate flexibility, so that the mechanism of adjustments of relative prices is not 
distorted. At the same time, monetary policy ought to be targeted on domestic credit and 
based on predetermined feedback rules. Such orientation will help to facilitate domestic 
credit necessary for structural adjustment and will create a ground for construction of 
domestic security markets (Orlowski, 1994). 
The currency stability shall be accomplished through a sustained, non-discretionary 
monetary policy oriented on controlling inflation. A steady course of anti-inflationary 
monetary policy will eventually improve credibility of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) 
and reduce “inertial” inflation, that is, the one which is self-propelled by rising inflation 
expectations of firms and consumers. At the same time, the environment of lower inflation 
will diminish the degree of real appreciation of the ZL when the spot exchange rate 
fluctuations are limited to the permitted band under the adjustable peg formula. The task of 
stabilizing the exchange rate shall not be based on a completely flexible adjustment of the 
spot rate to the galloping inflation in an open market, but on the achievement of price 
stability in the first place. 
If the underlying spot rate is more stable and more predictable, it will be easier to offer 
forward contracts with more accurate ZL per foreign currency conversion rates and with a L. T. Orlowski 
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longer time horizon. Such contracts will improve the quality of hedging export receivables, 
import payables and income from international investment. Their longer time span  will help 
to hedge funds necessary for foreign direct investment in Poland and direct investment of 
Polish companies abroad, ultimately leading to acceleration of these activities. 
It shall be noted that several commercial banks in Poland have already established 
forward contracts, mostly in ZL per USD and ZL per DM transactions. They are, however, 
experiencing difficulties with setting proper forward rates and expanding their time horizon.  
Specifically, it is difficult to set proper forward rates on a longer time forward contracts 
under the present conditions of high inflation running around 30 percent annual rate and, 
therefore, more unpredictable real interest rates. Nevertheless, the only feasible solution is 
that forward rates shall be based on interest rate differentials. They will have the same degree 
of error as forecasted interest rates. Relating them to spot exchange rate forecasts would be 
more risky. The expected pattern of spot rates is even more unpredictable with the recent 
(May 19, 1995) departure from the adjustable peg to the “crawling bend” formula having a 
wider band of permitted fluctuations of plus-minus 7 percent
7. Since the present formula 
incorporates more risk of spot rate fluctuations, the need for forward contracts is even 
stronger. In essence, their accuracy depends on stabilization of the spot exchange rate which 
is closely tied to lower inflation accomplished through coherent programs of fiscal and 
monetary convergence. 
Forward contracts are the only type of currency derivatives in which the ZL shall be 
involved. It is impossible to enter the Polish currency into currency futures and options 
trading before the underlying security markets are well developed. Such involvement may be 
considered in a very remote future or, perhaps, it shall not be debated at all since the Polish 
monetary system will have to be gradually more aligned with the DM or the European 
Currency Unit (ECU) when the program of accession to the EU is under way. Consequently, 
the ZL will have to be closer tied to the future European currency and Polish banks will be 
able to use for hedging purposes futures and options between the European currency and 
other leading international currencies. Furthermore, the program of accession to the EU may 
also help to stabilize the ZL by the unavoidable reorientation of monetary policy targeting on 
stable ZL per ECU (or DM) rates (Orlowski, 1995). 
Regardless of the limited scope of involvement of the ZL in currency derivatives, 
Polish exporters, importers and banks when invoicing payments in DM, USD or other 
leading currencies ought to be engaged in international options markets. For instance, it 
would be particularly beneficial to obtain the DM per USD put option by exporters invoicing 
receivables in DM if the for any reason the USD were expected to considerably appreciate in 
DM terms above the put option strike price. This type of cross-currency hedging would 
significantly increase ZL gains from the transaction. Certainly, exporters shall always 
attempt to apply invoicing in the currency expected to appreciate the most, in this case in the 
USD.  This hedging transaction shall be considered if the exporters do not have a bargaining 
position to invoice payments in the most desirable currency, which would be a likely case of 
Polish firms exporting goods to Germany. 
                                              
7 The term “crawling bend” referring to the present exchange rate system in Poland has been suggested to me by 
prof. Andrzej Wojtyna. Recent Developments in International... 
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Correspondingly, Polish importers would significantly benefit from the DM per USD 
call option while invoicing payables in DM and expecting a considerable appreciation of the 
DM above the call option strike price. By exercising the option, the effective payment would 
be realized through the USD as a relatively weak currency. It would be, therefore, less 
expensive for Polish importers. In both cases, American-style options shall be preferred since 
they can always be exercised in advance or sold to a third party if spot rates assume 
unfavorable directions. 
Although similar effects could be calculated from hedging with currency futures, their 
markets shall not be advised to Polish firms willing to hedge payments. As discussed before, 
futures markets are less flexible in terms of settlement dates, the size of blocs of foreign 
currency in a single contract, and they are mostly used by speculators. 
In general terms, Polish exporters shall always make efforts to invoice receivables in 
the currency expected to appreciated the most and importers ought to follow the rule of 
invoicing payables in the currency expected to depreciate. If they do not have bargaining 
power to do so, they may maximize their gains by cross-hedging via currency-based 
derivatives, primarily forward contracts and currency options. In any case, the correct choice 
of their hedging or currency investment strategy very much depends on their accurate 
forecasts of key exchange rates not only between the ZL and other currencies, but also the 
rates between the leading international currencies. It is also advisable that Polish companies 
develop systems of accounting of exposure to currency fluctuations not only in the domestic 
currency, but parallelly also in USD, to allow to design most beneficial risk hedging 
schemes. 
The access to international currency-based derivative markets shall be also expanded 
for Polish banks and investment funds. Using currency derivatives gives them an opportunity 
to hedge the risk of converting foreign currency earnings into ZL. Existing barriers on 
international capital investment and high capital gain taxes shall be reduced to allow them to 
profit from international investing and accumulate capital funds. At the same time, 
speculation by Polish firms in international derivatives markets ought to be discouraged.  
Speculative transactions generated considerable losses in 1994/95, especially to 
inexperienced participants. These losses are likely to persist if underlying currencies spot 
rates continue to exhibit increasing volatility and misalignment. 
Polish international trade companies shall be fully aware that the risk of exposure to 
exchange rate fluctuations can be also hedged with methods not involving currency-based 
derivatives. This is particularly important when the ZL per foreign currency exchange rates 
show an increasing degree of volatility and unpredictability. Among such methods the 
money-market hedge is highly recommended. Specifically, if an exporter sells goods to 
Germany and invoices receivables in DM, it may borrow a DM loan from a German bank at 
the time of signing the contract. Simultaneously, the Polish exporter will exchange borrowed 
DM into ZL at the current spot rate and invest the amount in ZL denominated interest-
bearing assets. It will generate a desirable ZL income for the time of duration of the export 
contract. At the end, the collected receivables in the future will be used to repay the German 
bank loan. This transaction is risk-free since it involves all parameters (the German credit 
rate, the ZL deposit rate and the current spot exchange rate) known upon the contract 
origination. The income will, therefore, depend on the amount of earning from the ZL-
denominated assets. It can be easily observed that this operation is beneficial if the ZL real L. T. Orlowski 
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interest rate or, eventually, the DM deposit rate in a Polish bank exceed the real rate of 
interest on the German bank loan. 
A similar scheme can be also applied by Polish importers.  If they invoice payables in 
DM, they may consider borrowing ZL from a Polish bank, converting the amount to DM 
today, and investing in DM interest-bearing securities for the duration of the import contract.  
The DM assets will be later cashed-in and used to cover DM payables. At the same time in 
the future the Polish bank loan will be repaid in ZL, which in effect will be a cost of the 
import transaction. This time, the ZL credit real interest rate must be lower than the DM 
asset interest rate to exercise relative gains from this transaction. 
In summary, international currency-based derivative products open vast opportunities 
for firms of the emerging market economy of Poland. Yet, they bring a growing degree of 
risk for speculative transactions. It is desirable for Polish companies to engage in these 
markets to enhance hedging opportunities and to maximize profits from international 
investing. To a limited degree, forward contracts on the ZL exchange rate shall be expanded.  
But building derivative security markets in transition economies must be preceded by 
strengthening of underlying security markets, which success strongly depends on the ability 
of the economic authority to reduce inflation. The policy adjustments that are inevitable in 
rational programs of preparation for accession to the EU will help to strengthen domestic 
security markets, stabilize inflation and the exchange rate and, ultimately, assist in a future 
construction of derivative security markets. 
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